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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITHOUT THE
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.
The Constitution of the United States' provides that the
President "shall have power by, and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur." Judge Story, in his work on the Constitu-
tion in commenting on this passage, says: "The power to make
treaties is by the Constitution general, and, of course, it embraces
all sorts of treaties for peace or war; for commerce or territory;
for alliance or succors; for indemnity for injuries or payment of
debts; for the recognition and enforcement of principles of public
law, and for any other purposes which the policy or interests of
independent sovereigns may dictate in their intercourse with each
other."'
From this it might be supposed that an agreement with a
foreign state, to which the approbation of the Senate has not been
given, is a thing unknown to our constitutional practice. This is,
however, not the fact, and it will be the purpose of this article to
point out .that there are certain classes of international agree-
ments, in the making of which the Senate does not have a share.
I.
Before passing to an examination of the several classes it
should be noted that the Constitution recognizes' certain interna-
tional agreements which are not treaties. 2 While the states are
forbidden to enter into "any treaty, alliance or confederation,"
they may, with the consent of Congress, make agreements and
compadts with each other or with foreign powers. 3
The Articles ofConfederation forbade the states, without the
consent of Congress, to "enter into any conference, agreement,
alliance or treaty with any king, prince or state," or, without the
same assent, "to enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance"
with each other.' The omission of "agreement " from the sec-
ond list was apparently construed by certain states to permit
x. Constitution Art. II, See. 2.
2. Commentaries on the Constitution § x5o8.
3. Constitution. Art. I, Sec io, cl. i and 3.
4. Articles of Confederation, Art. VI, Sees. i and 2.
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agreements between members of the confederation. Thus, Vir-
ginia and North Carolina, in 1779, and Pennsylvania and Virginia,
in 1784, made agreements with reference to their common bound-
aries. In 1783, Pennsylvania and New Jersey came to an agree-
ment as to the jurisdiction of the two states over the river Dela-
ware and its islands. New York and Massachusetts, in 1786
made an agreement for the surrender by the latter of its land
claims in Western New York.5 In 1785, Maryland and Virginia
entered into a compact respecting navigation and jurisdiction in
Chesapeake bay, Pocomoke sound and the Potomac river, and also
as to port regulations and fisheries in these waters. It was ex-
pressly held by the Supreme Court, in Wharton v. Wise, that the
last mentioned agreement was not a "treaty, alliance or confed-
eration " within the meaning of Article VI, paragraph 2, of the
Articles of Confederation. 6 It should also be noted that the Arti-
cles of Confederation provided that "differences" between two
or more states concerning boundaries, jurisdiction, or any other
cause whatever," might, on petition to Congress by one of the par-
ties, be referred for settlement to a commission to be established
under the direction of Congress, and that the decision thereof
should be final." Reference to Congress was, therefore, optional,
and the provision manifestly contemplated an attempted settle-
ment by the states involved before appeal was made to Congress.
The practice in this matter under the confederation s evi-
dently lead the framers of the Constitution to prohibit agreements
or compacts, except with the consent of Congress. Since the
adoption of the Constitution, numerous agreements or compacts,
relating principally to boundaries, have been made between states,
but all, so far as known, with Congressional assent.
Judge Story, writing in 1833, considered that the precise dis-
tinction between the words, "treaty," "agreement," and." com-
pact" was not clear. He seemed inclined, however, to assign to
the first term engagements of a political chtracter. The other
two, he thought, might apply to "what might be deemed mere
private rights of sovereignty, such as questions of boundary, in-
s. Gannett, Boundaries of the United States, 97, 86, 83, 84, 69. Poole v.
Fleeger, ii Pet. i85.
6. Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S, 163.
7. Articles of Confederation, Art. IX, Sec. 2.
8. Madison in his "Notes on Proceeding of the Federal Convention," re-
ferred to the above agreements between Virginia and Maryland and Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey as "compacts without previous application or subse-
quent apology." Doe. Hist. of the Const. III, 155.
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terests in land, situated in the territory of each other, and other
internal regulations for the mutual comfort and convenience of
states, bordering on each other." 9
The meaning of the words "treaty," "agreement" and
"compact," as applied in international relations was discussed by
Chief Justice Taney in the case of Holmes v. Jennison, in the year
1840. 10 The question here involved was the right of a state (Ver-
mont) to surrender a fugitive from justice, on the request of a
foreign government (lower Canada), and it was there held that
the surrender might not lawfully be made, because it necessarily
involved an agreement between a state and a foreign power to
which the assent of Congress had not been given. In considering
the meaning of the words "treaty," "agreement" and "compact"
as used in Article I, Section io of the Constitution, Chief Justice
Taney observed that "the words 'agreement' and 'compact' can-
not be construed as synonymous with one another, and still less
can either of them be held to mean the same thing with the word
'treaty,' in the preceding clause." . . . "Undoubtedly in the
sense in which the word is generally used, there is no treaty (here)
between Vermont and Canada. For when we speak of a ' treaty
we mean an instrument written and executed with the formalities
customary among nations; and as no clause in the Constitution
ought to be interpreted differently from the usual and fair import
of the words used, if the decision of this case depended upon the
word above mentioned, we should not be prepared to say that
there was any express prohibition of the power exercised by the
state of Vermont." He then proceeds to quote the definition of
these words as given by Vattal who says: "A treaty, in Latin
foedus, is a compact made with a view to the public welfare, by
the superior power, either for perpetuity or for a considerable
time."
"The compacts which have temporary matters for their ob-
ject, are called agreements, conventions and pactions. They are
accomplished by one single act and not by repeated acts. These
compacts are perfected in their execution once for all; treaties
receive a successive execution whose duration equals that of the
treaty. 11
It is true that Vattel's definition of agreements, quoted by
Jue.ge Taney, speaks of them as "accomplished by one single act
Story on the Constitution §§ 1402, 1403.
io. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 54o.
ii. Ibid 571, 572, 573, and Vattel, Law of Nations, II % 152, 153.
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and not by a series of acts . . perfected in their execution
once for all." The reference here is said to be to so-called "tran-
sitory conventions," "transitory," because by their nature they
are at once executed and leave nothing more to be done. As
Vattel says elsewhere, 1 2 of agreements of this kind, " if they are
valid, they have in their own nature a perpetual and irrevocable
effect." Such, according to Wheaton, are treaties of cession,
boundary or exchange of territory, which are not abrogated like
other treaties on the breaking out of war between the contracting
parties.1 s Nevertheless, it may be doubted whether the framers
of the Constitution used the words agreement and compact, either
in the restricted or extended sense. They had in mind the vari-
ous compacts which the states, under the confederation, had
made with each other, and they intended apparently to provide
that if the states made agreements in the future, it must be with
the assent of Congress. The language of the constitutional pro-
vision is that "no state shall, without the consent of Congress,
enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with
a foreign power." (I 10, 3). There is no distinction here be-
tween agreements, domestic or foreign, and the rule of construc-
tion, noscitur a socis, would raise the presumption of a similar
meaning and limitation for both. 14 The case of Holmes v. Jenni-
son is, however, authority for the proposition that extradition by a
state at the request of a foreign government, necessarily involves
an agreement which is one of those forbidden to the states to
enter into except with the consent of Congress. It also declares
obiter, that such an agreement is not a treaty. The inference,
therefore, is that extradition and similar agreements, made by the
states, would be lawful, if authorized by Congress.
It is believed that the only instance of agreements between
a state of the Union and a foreign power (and that too, without
the consent of Congress), were those growing out of the interests
x2. Vattel, Law of Nations II, ch. 12, § 192.
13. Wheaton's International Law, pt. III, ch. 2, §§9, Io.
14. Mr. Justice Field in Virginia v. Tennessee, referring to agreements
and compacts between the states said, that the prohibition "is directed to the
formation of any combination tending to increase the political power of the
States, which may encroach upon, or interfere with, the just supremacy of the
United States." In delivering the opinion of the Court in Stearns v. Minne"
sota, Mr. Justice Brewer pointed out that a distinction exists between agree-
ments between the States which relate merely to property rights, and agree-
ments which have a political object, the former being permissible, the latter
not. r48 U. S. at p. 519. 179 U. S. at p. 244.
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of Maine and Massachusetts in the northeastern boundary dispute
with Great Britain, and relating more particularly to the so-called
Aroostook War in 1839. The dispute had then reached an acute
stage and armed forces from Maine and New Brunswick had been
marched into the disputed territory. A collision was averted
through the mediation of General Scott, and an agreement was
reached by the governors of Maine and New Brunswick, March
21-23, 1839, by which each side was to retain possession of terri-
tory occupied by each, pending final adjustment by the American
and British governments, but without prejudice to their respective
rights and claims; the Maine forces to consist of a civic posse
kept there to prevent timber depredations. This arrangement, in
a sense, carried into effect an earlier agreement signed by Mr.
Forsyth, Secretary of State, and Mr. Fox, the British Minister,
on February 27, of the same year, in which an understanding was
reached as to the line of conduct to be recommended to the gov-
ernors of Maine and New Brunswick in dealing with the diffi-
culty. But as the terms of the two arrangements differed, it can-
not be said that the second was a fulfillment of the first.
1 1
The interests of Maine and Massachusetts were in part pro-
vided for in Article V of the Webster-Ashburton treaty, wherein
it was stipulated that,
,, Whereas, in the course of the controversy respecting the disputed terri-
tory on the northeastern boundary, some moneys have been received by the
authorities of Her Britauic Majesty's Province of New Brunswick, with the in-
tention of preventing depredations on the forests of the said territory, which
moneys were to be carried to a fund called the ' disputed Territory Fund,'
the proceeds whereof it was agreed should be hereafter paid over to the par-
ties interested in the proportions to be determined by a final settlement of
boundaries: It is hereby agreed that a correct account of all receipts and pay-
ments on the said fund shall be delivered to the government of the United
States within six months after the ratification of this treaty, and the proportion
of the amount due thereon to the states of Maine and Massachusetts, and any
bonds or securities appertaining thereto shall be paid and delivered over to
the government of the United States, and the government of the United States
agrees to receive for the use of, and pay over to the states of Maine and Mas-
sachusetts their respective portions of said fund."
We learn from notes exchanged between Mr. Pakenham,
British minister in Washington, and Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of
State, on March 17 and April 21, 1847, respectively, that agents
of Maine and Massachusetts properly accredited to the governor
of New Brunswick by letters from Mr. Pakenham and Mr. Buch-
anan proceeded to New Brunswick and there effected a settlement
x5. Memoirs of General Scott, II; 347-351, 338-341.
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of the disputed territory fund account with commissioners
appointed by the provincial government. The result was a
"deed of agreement and settlement concluded between the agents
and commissioners on both sides, and the money found to be due
to the states of Maine and Massachusetts, and the bonds and securi-
ties appertaining thereto were paid over and delivered to the
agents of those states."
The agents of the two states had the duty, according to the
terms of the article above quoted, to agree upon "the proceeds
to be paid the parties interested in the proportions" determined
by the final settlement of the boundary line. This must have
been principally a mathematical calculation. The resulting
agreements would certainly be among those described by Vattel
as "compacts perfected in their execution once for all" and
accomplished by a gingle act." But they were evidently not
thought by Mr. Buchanan and President Polk to require the con-
stitutional assent of Congress.
It can hardly be said that the assent of the Senate to the Web-
ster-Ashburton treaty, by recognizing the claims of Maine and
Massachusetts, gave legal validity to the proceeding. The pro-
visions of Article V of the treaty contemplated that the claims
should be adjusted by the government of the United States act-
ing in behalf of the two states. Practical considerations, how-
ever, made it preferable that the real parties in interest should
settle the account. The object of the above correspondence be-
tween Buchanan and Pakenham was, therefore, to establish the
fact that the British government was discharged of all obligations
in the matter, and Buchanan replied that the United States gov-
ernment so regarded it." 1 a
The opinion has been expressed that it is beyond the com-
petence of a state of the Union, and a bordering province of
Canada to enter into an agreement; for example, to regulate
fisheries in their contiguous waters.1  With all deference to the
i6. Ex. Doe. 63, 37 Cong. 2 sess. vol, 5.
It may be thought that this agreement is referable to the war power of thestates, which is exercisible when they are Iactually invaded" (Const. I, 1o, 2)Webster in his speech in the Senate in defense of the Treaty of Washingtonsaid that "Something like a border war had broken out. . . . There wasFort Fairfield, Fort Kent and I know not what other fortresses, all memorable
in history." Works, vol. 5, P. 93.
17. Butler's Treaty Making Power I, § r23.Although the British North American Act of [867 vested in the DominionParliament exclusive legislative powers in respect to "sea coast and inland
fisheries" (Sec. 9x), it appears to be modified as to the Province of Ontario bysubsequent act of the Imperial Parliament (48 V. ct. 9, S. 2) which gave tthe Legislature of Ontario rights of legislation in respect to fisheries in thaprovince. Revised Statutes of Ontario (1887), I, 337.
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learned authority, it seems that such an agreement would be
lawful if sanctioned by Congress. It would, of course, be prefer-
able that the whole matter of fishery in the bordering great
lakes and rivers should be regulated by treaty, made with Great
Britain in behalf of the Dominion of Canada, if the Constitution
permits. In the absence of formal treaty, there is certainly no
legal obstacle to an agreement of this kind.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said that the
Constitution contains no grant to the Federal government of a
power to regulate fisheries in the several states. 
1 8 It must, there-
fore. be one of those powers, which by the tenth amendment are
expressly reserved to the states. As Professor Burgess has ob-
served, "It (the treaty-making power) is certainly limited by the
general principle of the Constitution, i. e., by the constitutional
distribution of the powers of government between the general
government and the commonwealths. The treaty-making power
cannot deal with any subject reserved by the Constitution to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the commonwealths."
'1 9
Mr. Butler, on the other hand, thinks that under Article VI
of the Constitution (making treaties the supreme law of the land),
the Federal government may, "go much further in regulating
matters within the jurisdiction of the states than the legislative
department of the government can go."
2'' In Manchester v.
Massachusetts,2 1 Mr. Justice Blatchford said that the state of
Massachusetts necessarily had control of her fisheries in the ab-
sence of congressional legislation assuming control for the na-
tional government. But he said that as to the right of the Fed-
eral government so to do, he expressed no opinion. Whichever
view is correct, the power to protect fisheries in the states, resides
at present in their respective governments. Pending the settle-
ment of the constitutional question by the Supreme Court (as
must eventually be done), the bordering states of the Union may
find it necessary to act in their own behalf, and make fisheries
agreements with the Dominion or Provincial governments.
This would seem very plainly to be the sort of agreement
contemplated by the constitutional provision here discussed. The
mere subject-matter of the agreement would not make it a treaty
iS. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 39I. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S.
133.
xg. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 6, p. 343.
20. Butler op. cit. p. 321, citing 8 Opp. Atty. Gen. 441.
2X, 139 U. S. 240.
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as the word is used in the Constitution. The states may make
with each other boundary adjustments and cessions of territory,
but these are not treaties. Neither would it be a treaty because
-made with a foreign colony, for the Constitution expressly pro-
vided for agreements with a foreign power. One is forced either
to adopt this conclusion or to admit that, under our Constitution,
the treaty-making power is divided, and that engagements with
foreign states, which are political in character and interest the
states as a whole, are made by the President, ordinarily with the
concurrence of the Senate, and that those which are merely local
and non-political may be made by the states with the consent of
Congress. In any event, the arrangement becomes a national
act by receiving Congressional sanction and thus avoids the dan-
ger of particularism.
In other federal system (for example, Germany and Switzer-
land) the component states have a limited right of making
treatises with each other and with foreign states. In Germany
they also have the right of sending and receiving diplomatic
agents. 22 A fundamental law of the empire permits postal and
telegraph treaties between the individual states and their im-
mediate foreign neighbors. 23 Actual practice has, however,
been much broader. The individual states have made treaties
with their immediate foreign neighbors relating to fishery and
navigation in the Rhine and Lake Constance; also as to bound-
aries, railroads and extradition. 24 In only one instance, that
of the boundary convention of April 28, 1878, between Baden
and Switzerland, does there seem to have been a confirmation
by the Imperial government of these arrangements. In this
case the convention of June 24, 1879, with Switzerland, recog-
nized the preceding one as having legal validity for the German
empire. 25
The Swiss constitution gives to the confederation the sole
right of "concluding alliances and treaties with foreign pow-
ers," but" by exception the Cantons preserve the right of con-
cluding treatises with foreign powers, respecting the administra-
tion of public property, and border and police intercourse; but
such treaties shall contain nothing contrary to the confedera-
22. Wilson, The State, § 543.
23. Burgess, Political Science, II, 163.
24. Martens, Nouveau Recueil Generale de Trartes. 2 Serie, X, Table
Generale, See names of various states and volums cited.
25. Ibid X, 430, 433.
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tion or to the rights of other Cantons." Treaties made by the Can-
tons are to be brought before the federal assembly (Parliament)
for approval, only in case the federal council (the executive) or
another Canton protests. Thus a Cantonal treaty with a foreign
power may go into operation and become a binding contract,
without the government of the confederation participating in
the arrangement. The Constitution provides, also, that while
" official intercourse between the Cantons and foreign govern-
ments or their representatives, shall take place through the fed.
eral council, nevertheless, the Cantons may correspond directly
with the inferior officials and officers of a foreign state in re-
gard to subjects enumerated in the preceding article." 2 6
The centralizing process has been carried further in Switz-
erland than in Germany; for the constitution restricts the treaty-
making power of the Cantons by express limitations and the
right of legation has become a mere power of corresponding
with surbordinate foreign officials.
The reasons for these differences between the constitutions
of Germany and Switzerland and that of the United States are
of course historical. The thirteen original states, during the
time that they lived under the Articles of Confederation, never
26. Swiss Constitution (Hart's Translations), Articles 8, 9, 10, 82 § 5.
Bluntschli classes as treaties those "concluded between the subordinate
authorities or different administrative services of two or more states, as to
matters relating to the exercise of their functions." Those which enter "par-
tially" into this class, he adds, are those which "have for their object the
regulation of frontiers, when this matter is left to provincial governments;
judicial requisitions effectuated without the intervention of the supreme au-
thority; reformations of river courses in the provinces; . . .treaties between
neighboring communes of two different states, relative to questions of local
and communal interest." Droit. Int. § 432, 2.
These are manifestly the agreements contemplated by articles 1o7 and io8
of the Constitution of Argentina, where it is provided that "the Provinces
shall have the power to conclude, with the knowledge of the federal Congress,
such ftarlial treaties, as may be necessary for the purposes of administrative
justice, or for regulating provincial interests, or undertaking public works,
&c." But "they cannot, without authority from the federal Congress, enter
into any partial treaties of a: political character."
The agreements referred to, in Bluntschli's work and in the Argentine
Constitution, as partial treaties, relate to matters of an administrative and
judicial character, or are purely local in scope and application. They are con.
fessedly treaties of a quasi sort. In the view of the present writer, they ought
to be called "agreements" and thus differentiated from engagements between
nations, which necessarily belong to the field of foreign policy or international
law.
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made individually any treaties with foreign powers. In Ger-
many and Switzerland the component states had for several cen-
turies each enjoyed the right of making treaties and the right of
legation. The adoption of more centralized forms of govern-
ment naturally involved compromises in favor of state indepen-
dence and the results were those which have been described.
The states of the American Union have no standing internation-
ally. As to foreign powers they are mere departments. The
sole point at which they can come into official relations with a
foreign government is by means of a local and non-political
agreement.
The writer does not wish to be understood as supporting the
proposition that the states of the American union ought in prac-
tice to enter into agreements with foreign powers. Whenever
possible the subject should be regulated through action by the
general government. Nevertheless, it is the basic principle of
federal government that -the individual states enjoy an
autonomy in matters merely local, not effecting the interests of
the state as a whole. May there not properly be an autonomy
in local external affairs, at least as to the states bordering on
Canada or Mexico, just as there is a local autonomy in matters
purely domestic? The constitutional provision, "agreement or
compacts with foreign powers " plainly indicates its existence.
Constitutional practice in Europe on this subject points to the
field in which the members of a federal government may safely
be permitted to regulate their external affairs. The provisions
of the Swiss constitution limit these agreements to the adminis-
tration of public property and border and police intercourse.
Here is a field, non-political in character, which, if restricted to
agreements with immediate foreign neighbors, might, perhaps
be left to the states. As has been said, the necessity of subse-
quent approval by Congress, removes the danger of confedera-
tism.
(To be concluded.)
